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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
DALLAS DIVISION 
            
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §  
 §  
v. § CRIMINAL NO. 3:20-CR-00274-N 
 §  
WILHAN MARTONO (1) §  
 
 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
TO THE HONORABLE DAVID C. GODBEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 
 
 COMES NOW WILHAN MARTONO, Defendant, by and through undersigned counsel in 
the above entitled and numbered case, and files this Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, based on 
FOSTA and their associated forfeiture allegations because the statute is unconstitutionally over-
broad and therefore invalid. The statute is also unconstitutionally vague and therefore void. In 
the alternative, the indictment fails to state the essential elements of 18 U.S.C. §2421A so the 
charges stemming from that statute should be dismissed. Defendant also moves the court to dis-
miss counts three through eleven which assert violations of the Travel Act, plus their associated 
criminal forfeiture allegations. These counts are fatally defective because they fail to assert the 
essential elements of the offense.  Finally, the Court should also dismiss counts twelve through 
twenty-eight which allege money laundering because those counts rely on violations of FOSTA 
and the Travel Act as predicate offenses.  
              Respectfully submitted, 
       /s/ Peter M. Barrett                  
       PETER M. BARRETT 
       State Bar No. 00790272 
       BARRETT BRIGHT LASSITER LINDER PEREZ 
       3300 Oak Lawn Avenue, Suite 700 
       Dallas, Texas 75219 
 O: (214) 526-0555 
 F: (214) 526-0551 
 E: peter@barrettcrimelaw.com 
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       /s/ Alexandria Cazares-Perez            
 ALEXANDRIA CAZARES-PEREZ 
                   
      3300 Oak Lawn Avenue, Ste 700 




State Bar No. 24096446 
              
                   ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
Case 3:20-cr-00274-N   Document 23   Filed 09/17/20    Page 2 of 29   PageID 342
 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS                                Page 1 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
DALLAS DIVISION 
            
UNITED STATE OF AMERICA §  
 §  
v. § CRIMINAL NO. 3:20-CR-00274-N 
 §  
WILHAN MARTONO (1) §  
 
 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
TO THE HONORABLE DAVID C. GODBEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 
 
COMES NOW WILHAN MARTONO, Defendant, by and through undersigned counsel in 
the above entitled and numbered case, and files this Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of De-
fendant’s Motion to Dismiss, and respectfully shows this Court as follows: 
Introduction 
 A grand jury returned an indictment against Wilhan Martono, charging him with violating 18 
U.S.C. §2421A, Promotion or Facilitation of Prostitution and Reckless Disregard of Sex Traf-
ficking (“FOSTA”). The first count of the indictment charges Martono with the base offense and 
both aggravated forms of the offense. IN.10. Martono’s alleged violation of this statute also 
serves as the predicate offense for counts 12 through 28, charging him with the laundering of 
money instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1)(B)(i). IN.10, 15–17. FOSTA also 
serves as a predicate offense for criminal forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. §2428(a) and 18 U.S.C. 
§982(a)(1). IN.18.  
 The indictment also charges Martono for conspiracy and substantive counts under the Travel 
Act—18 U.S.C. §1952(a)(3)(A) and 371. These charges also serve as predicate offenses for 
criminal forfeiture.  
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Grounds for Dismissal of Certain Counts 
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) authorizes motions to dismiss that raise any de-
fense, objection, or request which is capable of determination without a trial of the general issue. 
Martono moves for dismissal of all charges with the exception of count two which charges a vio-
lation of conspiracy to violate the Travel Act.  
 Martono moves for dismissal of the FOSTA derived counts because FOSTA is invalid be-
cause it is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The First Amendment to the Constitution dic-
tates that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” While laws or poli-
cies that target conduct but only incidentally burden speech have been upheld as valid, see, e.g., 
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122–23 (2003), and courts have recognized narrow constitution-
al carve outs, such as obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal 
conduct, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010), laws imposing criminal penalties 
on protected speech constitute speech suppression and are invalid. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coa-
lition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). FOSTA explicitly criminalizes speech through its use of the 
terms “promotes” and “facilitates.” Its speech restriction is content-based and viewpoint-
discriminatory because it criminalizes only speech that is opposed to the Government’s view of 
prostitution. Even if the statute were said to target some conduct, its sweep of protected speech is 
too broad. It is unconstitutionally overbroad and invalid as a result. 
 The statute is unconstitutionally vague as well. It criminalizes an interactive computer user 
who promotes or facilitates the prostitution of another person, but doesn’t define “promote,” “fa-
cilitate,” or even “prostitution.” It allows an affirmative defense where the defendant proves the 
promotion or facilitation of prostitution is legal in the jurisdiction where the promotion or facili-
tation was targeted,” but doesn’t define “jurisdiction” or “targeted” either. All of these words are 
susceptible to multiple and wide-ranging meanings. They render the statute so vague that it fails 
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to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, and is so standardless that it invites 
arbitrary enforcement. It flouts the essentials of due process and is therefore invalid.  
 Alternatively, if the court were to judicially construct “facilitates or promotes the prostitution 
of another person” to mean to ensnare only specific unlawful acts with respect to a particular in-
dividual, and not the broad subject matter of prostitution, see Woodhull Freedom Found. v. Unit-
ed States, 334 F. Supp. 3d 185 (D.D.C. 2018), reversed by Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United 
States, 948 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020), the indictment would still be fatally defective because it 
fails to assert the essential elements of 18 U.S.C. §2421A under that construction.  
 Martono also moves for dismissal of the substantive Travel Act charges because they fail to 
state the essential elements of the offenses. Alternatively, the Court should dismiss these charges 
because they are too vague to enable the Court to determine whether the conduct can be punished 
without infringing the First Amendment. Failing that, the Court should strike vague language 
references and indistinct laws.    
 
 
Legal Standards for Indictments 
 Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires an indictment to include a “plain, 
concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charge. The 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments demand that a grand-jury indictment set forth each essential ele-
ment of an offense. United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 1989). The indictment 
must do more than simply repeat the language of the criminal statute. Russell v. United States, 
369 U.S. 749, 764, 82 S. Ct. 1038, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1962). It “must charge positively and not in-
ferentially everything essential.” United States v. Dentler, 492 F.3d 306, 309 (5th Cir. 2007). 
Language of a statute may be used to describe the offense, but that language must be accompa-
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nied with enough “facts and circumstances” to “inform the accused of the specific offense . . . 
with which he is charged.” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117–18 (1974) (“Undoubtedly 
the language of the statute may be used in the general description of an offence [sic], but it must 
be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused 
of the specific offense, coming under the general description, with which he is charged.”), (quot-
ing United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487 (1888)). Indictments that involve speech, as this one 
does, must go further. It must specifically identify the precise conduct alleged to fall outside of 
constitutional protection.  See United States v. Buddenberg, No. CR-09-00263, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 78201, 2010 WL 2735547, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2010) (“Rule 7 requires the United 
States to identify or at least summarize the actual words or expressive conduct that forms the ba-
sis of the charge.”); United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 582–83 (D. Md. 2011). A bill 
of particulars cannot save an invalid indictment. See Russell, 369 U.S. at 769–70. 
 When considering a motion to dismiss, the court is to “take the allegations of the indictment as 
true and determine whether an offense has been stated” in a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
indictment under Rule 12(b)(1)(B)(v). United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2004). 
It, however, should not consider allegations that are not relevant to the charges, gratuitous or in-
flammatory and prejudicial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d); United States v. Hughes, 766 F.2d 875, 
879 (5th Cir. 1985) (observing that irrelevant or immaterial facts, particularly those that might 
prejudice the jury may be struck from an indictment); United States v. Bullock, 451 F.2d 884, 
888 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that the “inclusion of clearly unnecessary language in an indictment 
that could only serve to inflame the jury, confuse the issues, and blur the elements necessary for 
confusion under the separate counts involved surely can be prejudicial”). That said, the Court 
also should not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal 
conclusions. See United States v. Reece, No. 12-CR-00146, 2013 U.S. Dist. 92298, at *7 (5th 
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Cir. April 30, 2013) (finding that the Government’s descriptive term confused the issues and was 
prejudicial); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009) (outlining the standard of review for 
the dismissal of civil complaints).  
 
The FOSTA Statute 
 The Statute that allows States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. 
L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) (“FOSTA” or “the Act”) was signed into law on April 11, 
2018 and took immediate effect. 132 Stat. 1253, §4(b). 18 U.S.C. §2421A is a new section of the 
U.S. Code and is the centerpiece of FOSTA. This section reads as follows: 
(a) In general. Whoever, using a facility or means of interstate or foreign com-
merce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, owns, manages, or oper-
ates an interactive computer service (as such term is defined in defined in section 
230(f) the Communications Act of 1934 or conspires or attempts to do so, with 
the intent to promote or facilitate the prostitution of another person shall be fined 
under this title, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both. 
 
(b) Aggravated violation. Whoever, using a facility or means of interstate or for-
eign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, owns, manages, 
or operates an interactive computer service (as such term is defined in section 
230(f) the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(f)), or conspires or at-
tempts to do so, with the intent to promote or facilitate the prostitution of another 
person and— 
 
 (1) promotes or facilitates the prostitution of 5 or more persons; or 
 
 (2) acts in reckless disregard of the fact that such conduct contributed to sex 
trafficking, in violation of 1591(a) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for 
not more than 25 years, or both. 
 
(c)  Civil recovery. Any person injured by reason of a violation of section 
2421A(b) may recover damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees in an action before 
any appropriate United States district court. 
 
(d) Mandatory restitution. Notwithstanding sections 3663 or 3663A and in addi-
tion to any other civil or criminal penalties authorized by law, the court shall or-
der restitution for any violation of subsection (b)(2). The scope and nature of such 
restitution shall be consistent with section 2327(b).  
 
(e) Affirmative defense. It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating 
subsection (a), or subsection (b)(1) where the defendant proves, by a preponder-
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ance of the evidence, that the promotion or facilitation of prostitution is legal in 
the jurisdiction where the promotion or facilitation was targeted. 
 
 It creates a federal criminal offense for owning, managing, or operating “an interactive com-
puter service . . . with the intent to promote or facilitate the prostitution of another person,” or 
attempting or conspiring to do so. 18 U.S.C. §2421A(a). This offense is punishable by a fine or 
up to ten years’ imprisonment. Id. Section 2421A further provides for aggravated versions of the 
offense, punishable by a fine or up to 25 years in prison. See id. at §2421(A)(b). The aggravated 
versions add the elements of “promotes or facilitates the prostitution of five or more persons” or 
“acts in reckless disregard of the fact that such conduct contributed to sex trafficking in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §1591(a)” to the base offense. 
 Section 1591(a) is an existing statute, prohibiting sex trafficking. Under FOSTA, victims of 
violations of Section 2421A may bring civil suits in federal court to “recover damages and rea-
sonable attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 2421A(c). FOSTA also directs the district court to order restitu-
tion for any violation of subsection (b)(2).  
 Next, FOSTA amends 47 U.S.C. §230, the “safe harbor” of the Communications Decency Act 
of 1996 (“CDA”). Section 230 has two key functions. First, it immunizes interactive computer 
services from criminal and civil liability for content created by third parties. See 47 U.S.C. 
§230(c)(1) (providing that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider”); Id. at 230(e)(3) (preempting conflicting state and local law); see also Bennett v. 
Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“The intent of the [Communications De-
cency Act] is thus to promote rather than chill internet speech.”); see also Jones v. Dirty World 
Entertainment Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Section 230 marks a depar-
ture from the common-law rule that allocates liability to publishers or distributors of tortious ma-
terial written or prepared by others.”). Section 230, at the time, encouraged service providers to 
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self regulate the dissemination of offensive material. Bennett, 882 F.3d at 1165. These two grants 
of immunity “incentivize[s] companies to neither restrict content nor bury their heads in the sand 
in order to avoid liability.” Id.  
 FOSTA narrows the scope of Section 230’s immunities and preemptive effect. The Act states 
that “nothing in” Section 230(c)(1) “shall be construed to impair or limit” three categories of civ-
il claims and criminal prosecutions. Id. at 230(e)(5). First, it makes clear that Section 230 does 
not preclude civil claims by victims against perpetrators and persons in a [sex trafficking] ven-
ture” under 18 U.S.C. §1595 if the participation was “knowing.” See §230(e)(5)(A); 18 U.S.C. 
§1591. Second, Section 230 doesn’t preclude state criminal prosecution if the conduct underlying 
the charge would have violated 18 U.S.C. §1591. Id. at 230(e)(5)(B). And third, Section 230 
doesn’t preclude state criminal prosecution if the conduct would constitute a violation of 18 
U.S.C. §2421A. Id. at 230(e)(5)(C). These amendments to Section 230 “apply regardless of 
whether the conduct alleged occurred, or is alleged to have occurred, before, on, or after such 
date of enactment.” 132 Stat. 1253, § 4(b).  
 FOSTA also added a definition to 18 U.S.C. §1591. It clarified “participation in a venture” to 
mean “knowingly assisting, supporting, or facilitating” sex trafficking. Id. at §1591(e)(4). “Par-
ticipation in a venture” had appeared in the same section, but was undefined. See id. at 
1591(a)(2) (criminalizing the knowing “participation in a venture” to cause sex trafficking of an 
adult by “force, fraud, or coercion” or of a minor).  
 Finally, FOSTA amended Section 1595 to authorize state attorneys general to bring civil ac-
tions in parens patriae on behalf of state residents who have been “threatened or adversely af-
fected by any person who violates” 18 U.S.C. §1591. See 18 U.S.C. §1591(d). Section 1595, in 
other words, allows state attorneys general to step into the shoes of victims and bring civil suits 
on their behalf. Id.  
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Constitutional Overbreadth  
 The Constitution provides significant protection from overbroad laws that chill speech within 
the First Amendment’s vast and privileged sphere. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 
244 (2002). The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful 
speech. Id. at 255. Consequently, a law—even a criminal law—may be invalidated as overbroad 
if “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s 
plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2009) (quoting Wash. 
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n. 6 (2008); United States v. 
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (“A statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial 
amount of protected speech”). This is because speakers may be chilled from expressing them-
selves if overbroad criminal laws are on the books. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768–
69 (1982) (citing Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t., 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980)). 
If the overbreadth is “substantial,” the law may not be enforced against anyone, including the 
party before the court, unless it is narrowed to reach only unprotected activity, whether by legis-
lative action, judicial construction, or partial invalidation. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 
491, 503 (1985) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)). 
 The Government might want to argue that Martono’s “prostitution ads” are clearly not pro-
tected so he cannot challenge the validity of FOSTA, but that argument would be misplaced. 
Martono, charged with promoting or facilitating prostitution, can challenge FOSTA on its face as 
overbroad to combat its chilling effect. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 768–69; Williams, 553 U.S. at 292. 
This is because the statute threatens others not before the court—those who desire to engage in 
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legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or 
undertake to have the law declared partially invalid. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 503.   
 
First Amendment Principles 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that “sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene 
is protected by the First Amendment.” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 847 (1997) (citing Sable 
Comm. of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 
678, 701 (1977)). The indictment does not allege that any of the communications made the ob-
ject of the charges were obscene. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 125 (holding that there is no constitu-
tional stricture against Congress’ prohibiting the interstate transmission of obscene commercial 
telephone recordings). Escort services, for instance, enjoy First Amendment protections. See, 
e.g.s., Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 7-51-1102(11) & (12); Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-27-101 to 108; Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. §13-1422; Ala. Code § 13A-6-184; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-770(a)(8) and (9); Ark. Code 
Ann. §14-1-302(9), (10).  So does expressive nude dancing and all kinds of sex-related adver-
tisements. See Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 64–66 (1981); Backpage.com, L.L.C. v. Dart, 
807 F.3d 229, 230, 234 (7th Cir. 2015) (observing that advertisements promoting escorts, body 
rubs, strip clubs, domination, adult jobs didn’t infringe on any criminal laws and were protected 
by the First Amendment).  
 The First Amendment also protects editorial control and judgment. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. 
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (“The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the 
decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public is-
sues and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control and 
judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can 
be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to 
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this time.”). These constitutional protections extend to electronic platforms. Reno, 521 U.S. at 
870; see also Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011) 
(observing that basic principles of speech and press do not vary when a new and different medi-
um for communication, such as the internet, appears).  
 Congressional enactments are usually presumed constitutional, but this presumption is re-
versed when the Government seeks to restrict speech based on content. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 382 (1992). Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid. Id. The Government 
bears the burden to rebut that presumption. Id.; United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 
U.S. 803, 816 (2000); see also Bd. of Trustees v. State of Univ. of N.J., 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) 
(“[T]he State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions[.]”).   
 
FOSTA’s Overbreadth 
 FOSTA is unconstitutionally overbroad because it covers large swaths of protected speech. 
Williams, 553 U.S. at 293 (reasoning that the key in overbreadth analysis is understanding what a 
statute covers). Section 2421A makes it a crime for an interactive computer owner or manager to 
“promote or facilitate the prostitution of another person.” 18 U.S.C. §2421A(a). The verbs “pro-
mote” and “facilitate” are disjunctive, meaning that the interactive computer owner or manager 
could be criminally liable for “promoting” the prostitution of another person even in the absence 
of “facilitating” it, or vice versa. Neither verb is defined and is consequently susceptible to mul-
tiple and wide-ranging meanings. “Facilitating,” for instance, has been defined broadly in past 
cases such as “making it easier” or less difficult. See, e.g.s., United States v. Rivera, 775 F.2d 
1559, 1562 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Binkley, 903 F.2d 1130, 1135–36 (7th Cir. 1990). 
The Government argued for this definition in Abuelhawa v. United States, a case involving the 
construction and scope of 21 U.S.C. 843(b). 556 U.S. 816 (2009). The Court recognized that de-
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fining “facilitates” this way would give “improbable breadth” to the statute, and almost bound-
less discretion to the prosecution. Id. at 819, 823 n. 3. It rejected the Government’s proposed def-
inition and narrowed its scope, but did so on the basis of the statute’s calibration of drug buyer-
seller penalties. Id. at 821–22 (“The respect owed to that penalty calibration cannot be mini-
mized.”). But FOSTA isn’t structured with such a tier of penalties. The verb isn’t tethered to 
anything—a calibration of penalties or even another verb for that matter. Compare Williams, 553 
U.S. at 294 (recognizing “facilitates” was limited by a string of adjacent verbs, such as advertis-
es, distributes, or solicits, thereby conveying a transactional meaning narrowing the statute’s 
reach). And there is nothing in the statute suggesting Congress even had judicial limitations of 
unlawful activity in mind. The statute, in fact, recognizes that prostitution is not a crime in cer-
tain jurisdictions. 18 U.S.C. §2124A This means that an interactive computer owner or manag-
er—a SquareSpace site owner—may be criminally prosecuted for a third-party’s postings—a 
blogger’s comments—that could be construed in any way as making the act of prostitution easier 
or less difficult. This could apply to suggestions about electronic payments, location services, 
health-care services, security, child care, or even personal hygiene. As the Abuelhawa Court ob-
served, the Government’s prosecutorial discretion would be virtually boundless. 
 “Promote,” a disjunctive too, doesn’t modify “facilitate” and carries the same kind of wide-
ranging meaning. See Woodhull Freedom Found., 948 F.3d at 372 (“The terms ‘promote’ and 
‘facilitate,’ when considered in isolation, ‘are susceptible of multiple and wide-ranging mean-
ings.’”). The Oxford American English Dictionary defines it as “support or actively encourage a 
cause, venture, or aim.” Case law demonstrates arguments over the scope of its meaning. See, 
e.g.s., Rush v. Wyeth (In re Prempro Liab. Litig.), 514 F.3d 825, 832 (8th Cir. 2008) (observing 
that the district court’s definition of “promote” was different from that of a testifying expert); 
Omni Quartz, Ltd. v. CVS Corp., 98 Fed. Appx. 67, 67 (2d Cir. 2004) (deciding dispute between 
Case 3:20-cr-00274-N   Document 23   Filed 09/17/20    Page 13 of 29   PageID 353
 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS                 Page 12 
two definitions of “promotion”). Like “facilitate,” “promote” cannot be narrowed to something 
akin to aiding and abetting a crime because the statute doesn’t define prostitution as a crime.
1
 So, 
an interactive computer owner or manager may be criminally prosecuted for a third-party’s post-
ings that support or seek to advance the commission of prostitution even as a legal act. 
 These disjunctive verbs share the same constitutional defects that “encourages” and “induces” 
have in 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv),(“Subsection (iv)”). The Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Sineneng-Smith found that these disjunctive verbs rendered the criminal statute facially invalid 
because of unconstitutional overbreadth. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 
2018), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 2639 (U.S. May 7, 2020).  
 Evelyn Sineneng-Smith was convicted on two counts of encouraging and inducing an alien to 
remain in the United States for purposes of financial gain in violation of 8 U.S.C. 
§1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and 1324(a)(1)(B)(i). Id. at 467. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), (“Subsection 
(iv)”) permits the felony prosecution of any person who “encourages or induces an alien to come 
to, enter, or reside in the United States” if the encourager knew, or recklessly disregarded “the 
fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law.” Id. The Sineneng-
Smith court had to decide whether Subsection (iv) abridged constitutionally-protected speech be-
cause the plain meaning of the verbs “encourage” and “induce” were said to “restrict vast swaths 
of protected expression in violation of the First Amendment.” Id.  
 The court analyzed the meanings of “encourage or induce” and whether, and to what extent 
these verbs criminalized protected speech. Id. at 473. It considered the plain meanings given to 
both in case law and in dictionaries and concluded that the phrase “encourage or induce” could 
encompass both speech and conduct. Id. (“It is indisputable that one can encourage or induce 
                                                 
1
 The fact that the statute offers the legality of prostitution in a jurisdiction as an affirmative de-
fense demonstrates that the Government does not need to prove illegality to obtain a conviction.  
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with words, or deeds, or both.”). It also examined the context in which the phrase was used in the 
statute. Id. at 474. It concluded that “encourage” and “induce” could not be read so as not to en-
compass speech. Id. at 475. While the verbs might have applied to some conduct, “there is no 
way to get around the fact that [they] also plainly refer to First Amendment protected expres-
sion.” Id. at 475. 
 Deciding that the statute reached speech, the court considered whether the statute’s legitimate 
sweep restricted a substantial amount of speech. Id. at 479; see City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 
451, 459 (1987) (holding that criminal laws “that make unlawful a substantial amount of consti-
tutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid even if they also have legitimate appli-
cation”). The Government argued it did not. It said that the statute didn’t restrain protected 
speech at all because the speech involved was integral to assisting others in violating the immi-
gration laws. Id. at 480. The court, considering various examples of constitutionally protected 
speech coming within the ambit of the statute, concluded that the statute was “susceptible to reg-
ulation application to constitutionally protected speech and that there [was] a realistic (and actu-
al) danger that the statute will infringe upon recognized First Amendment protections.” Id. at 
483–84. It invalidated the statute, finding that it criminalized “a substantial amount of protected 
expression in relation to the statute’s narrow legitimate sweep” and thus was unconstitutionally 
overbroad. Id. at 485. The court said that even applying an implied mens rea only to speech to a 
particular person couldn’t save it. Id. at 484.  
 FOSTA, like Section iv, doesn’t contain an act or assistance requirement. See Sineneng-Smith, 
910 F.3d at 484; Woodhull Freedom Found, 948 F.3d at 373 (recognizing that “prostitution” 
could be viewed as an abstract theory or policy matter). Its breadth is unprecedented. Its terms 
sweep so broadly that it can be construed to criminalize any speech or conduct that “makes pros-
titution easier” or more likely. Its not limited to “bad-actor websites,” or even to classified-
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advertising websites. Woodhull Freedom Found., 948 F.3d at 373. Various individuals and or-
ganizations purporting to engage in constitutionally protected speech on the internet in advocacy 
for, dissemination of information and resources to, or hosting of others’ online speech about sex 
workers could be characterized as “promoting” or “facilitating” prostitution. Id. at 369. These 
include a national human rights organization dedicated to sexual freedom, an international hu-
man rights organization, an advocate for sex workers, a digital library of websites, and even a 
licensed massage therapist. Id. at 369–370. Discussions of what products or services sex workers 
use or should use, such as payment processors like PayPal, arguably come within the ambit of 
the statute because they could be thought to “facilitate” prostitution by making payment for sex-
ual services easier. Id. at 372. And these aren’t fanciful hypotheticals. Once it was enacted, a 
number of online service providers that had enabled interpersonal contact between users, like 
Craigslist and Reddit, immediately removed content and eliminated entire sections of their plat-
forms. Id. at 368.  
 The statute criminalizes a substantial amount of constitutionally-protected expression. Its 
open-ended prohibitions embrace advocacy groups, nonprofit entities, website forums, anybody 
posting anything that isn’t consistent with the Government’s view on prostitution. It is constitu-
tionally overbroad and therefore invalid. The court should dismiss counts one on this basis alone.   
 
FOSTA is Unconstitutionally Vague 
 The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend V; see Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) 
(vagueness doctrine is an outgrowth of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, not the 
First Amendment). The Government violates this guarantee by taking away someone’s life, liber-
ty, or property under a criminal law that is so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair no-
tice of the conduct it punishes or is so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement. Kolender 
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v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983). The prohibition of vagueness in criminal statutes “is a 
well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and settled rules 
of law,” and a statute that flouts it “violates the first essential of due process.” Connally v. Gen-
eral Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
 What renders a statute vague is not the possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to deter-
mine whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminancy 
of precisely what that fact is. Williams, at 305–06; See Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 
(1971); Reno, 521 U.S. at 870–71 n. 25. Thus, a law is vague, not in the sense that it requires a 
person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather 
in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. People must necessarily guess at its 
meaning as a result. Coates, 402 U.S. at 614. This is the problem with FOSTA. One must guess 
at its meanings and prohibition. This makes it unconstitutionally vague and invalid.  
 Section 2421A criminalizes,  
Whoever, using a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce or in or af-
fecting interstate or foreign commerce, owns, manages, or operates an interactive 
computer service (as such term is defined in defined in section 230(f) the Com-
munications Act of 1934 or conspires or attempts to do so, with the intent to pro-
mote or facilitate the prostitution of another person 
 
“Promote” isn’t defined. “Facilitate” isn’t defined. And neither is “prostitution.” There is no dis-
cernible limit as to what constitutes the promotion or facilitation of the prostitution of a person. 
 “Facilitating,” as said, has been defined broadly in the past as “making it easier.” Rivera, 775 
F.2d at 1562. Consider the Seventh Circuit’s use of the word in Doe v. GTE Corporation, a case 
construing 47 U.S.C. 230.  
A web host, like a delivery service or phone company, is an intermediary and 
normally is indifferent to the content of what it transmits. Even entities that know 
the information’s content do not become liable for the sponsor’s deeds. Does a 
newspaper that carries an advertisement for “escort services” or “massage par-
lors” aid and abet the crime of prostitution, if it turns out that some (or many) of 
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the advertisers make money from that activity? How about Verizon, which fur-
nishes pagers and cell phones to drug dealers and thus facilitates their business?  
 
347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasis supplied). 
Section 2421A doesn’t contain an act or assistance requirement or any requirement that the inter-
active computer owner have a specific desire to promote the content provider’s success. See gen-
erally United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc). So, as shown in 
GTE, “facilitate” on its own can be applied to almost any scenario, giving prosecutors unbridled 
prosecutorial discretion as a result. See Abuelhawa, 556 U.S. at 819–20, 823 n. 3 (observing that 
a word in a statute may extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities, giving the Gov-
ernment almost unlimited discretionary prosecutorial power).  
 “Promote,” meaning “advance” or “support,” doesn’t provide any clarification either. A dis-
junctive, its meaning is not limited by a string of other verbs. Cf. Williams, 553 U.S. at 294 (rec-
ognizing “facilitates” was limited by a string of adjacent verbs, such as advertises, distributes, or 
solicits, thereby conveying a transactional meaning narrowing the statute’s reach). The Govern-
ment could argue that when Congress enacted FOSTA, it intended the verbs to be defined with 
traditional judicial limitations on applying terms like “aid,” “abet,” and “assist.” See Abuelhawa, 
556 U.S. at 821(resolving a split among the circuits on whether the buyer’s use of phone in pur-
chasing drugs facilitated seller’s drug distribution). But the statute doesn’t lend any textual or 
structural support to the argument. Plus, there is no indication that Congress enacted the statute 
with any such traditional judicial limitation in mind. Compare id. This lack of such support, in 
fact, lends credence to giving both verbs their broadest and widest definitions which, in turn, 
lends itself to vagueness and arbitrary prosecution.   
 The statute not only does not define or limit its verbs, it doesn’t define “prostitution” either. 
“Prostitution” isn’t defined as the violation of any specific law, the commission of any specific 
act, or even a certain type of transaction. The word can mean “the act of debasing,” see, e.g., 
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Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 725 (3d Ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2011) (providing the exam-
ple of “The New York World called it ‘a conscious prostitution of his court to the service of one 
side in a partisan squabble.’”), and there is nothing in the text that suggests it cannot be defined 
this way.   
 The statute’s affirmative defense is of no help. It actually adds yet another layer of vagueness 
onto the phrase of “the prostitution of another person.” It provides,  
(e) Affirmative defense. It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating 
subsection (a), or subsection (b)(1) where the defendant proves, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the promotion or facilitation of prostitution is legal in 
the jurisdiction where the promotion or facilitation was targeted. 
 
 Whether “prostitution” is legal in a jurisdiction could very well depend upon how you want to 
define it. Prostitution in California means to engage in sexual conduct for money or other con-
sideration but doesn’t include sexual conduct as part of a stage performance, play, or other enter-
tainment open to the public. Cal. Penal Code 653.20. New Mexico doesn’t exempt public per-
formances, but does define “sexual act” differently, as “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, 
masturbation of another, anal intercourse or the causing of penetration to any extent and with any 
object of the genital or anal opening of another, whether or not there is any emission.” N.M.S.A. 
1978, 30-9-2. New Mexico doesn’t include anilingus, but Virginia does. See VA Code Ann. 
18.2-346. Virginia requires the intent to sexually arouse or gratify. New Mexico does not. Ore-
gon defines “sexual contact” as “any touching of the sexual organs or other intimate parts of a 
person not married to the actor for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of ei-
ther party” and sexual conduct as “sexual intercourse or oral or anal sexual intercourse” without 
defining sexual organs or intimate parts. O.R.S. 167.002. Texas doesn’t mention intimate parts. 
Tex. Penal Code 43.01.  
 What this shows is that “prostitution” as used in the affirmative defense is a fact-specific ques-
tion dependent upon idiosyncratic circumstances of who is doing what exactly to whom and 
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where he is doing it.
2
  In other words, there isn’t any singular definition of “prostitution” as used 
in the affirmative defense.
3
    
 The fact that local legality is an affirmative defense proves that illegality is not an element of 
the substantive offense. See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 237 (rejecting Government reli-
ance on a statutory affirmative defense which left a substantial amount of speech unprotected). In 
other words, the “prostitution of another person” doesn’t necessarily involve an illegal act. This 
being so, what definition is “prostitution” in the base offense supposed to carry? A common dic-
tionary definition? A legal definition? A Model State definition?
4
 One state’s definition over an-
other? Is it an abstract theory? Or does it at least involve a sex act? Does it include particular sex 
acts and exclude others? Cunnilingus? Masturbation? What about anilingus? Can an interactive 
computer owner may be successfully prosecuted for favorable reviews of a risqué version of 
Shakespeare in the Park?
5
 Or does the definition carry the same public performance exemption 
that California has? The fact that a single word in the base offense can carry so many multi-
faceted definitions in its application and doesn’t necessarily involve any illegal conduct should 
end the inquiry.  
 But it doesn’t. “Targeted” is also undefined and indefinite. See Horizon Pharma, Inc. v. Dr. 
Reddy’s Labs, Inc., No. 15-3324, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196702 (D.C. N.J. Nov. 19, 2018) (dis-
cussing how “target” clauses were invalid for indefiniteness); WBIP, LLC V. Kohler Co., 910 F. 
                                                 
22 The indictment refers to “hundreds of jurisdictions.” IN.7. It wouldn’t be a stretch to say that 
most, if not all, of them would have their own idiosyncratic definitions of “prostitution.” 
3
 Neither “promotion” nor “facilitation” are defined in the affirmative defense, which raises yet 
another vagueness issue. 
4
 See Model State Provisions on Pimping, Pandering, and Prostitution at 
https://www.justice.gov/olp/model-state-provisions-pimping-pandering-and-prostitution. Url 
searched on September 1, 2020.  
5
 A favorable review could “promote” or “facilitate” more ticket sales. More ticket sales could 
mean more revenue for costumes, stage craft, better insurance against STDs, better health care, 
condoms, and better trained actors for even better performances. “Prostitution” made easier. 
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Supp. 2d 325, 331 (D.C. Mass. 2012) (construing “target value” to include fluctuations around 
that target value during regular operation). (A “target” is a predetermined goal or objective and 
thus is neither random or arbitrary.).  
 “Jurisdiction,” too, “a word of many, too many, meanings,” isn’t defined either. See N. Cal. 
River Watch v. Wilcox, 633 F.3d 766, 774 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t., 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998). The phrase “under federal jurisdiction,” considered on its 
own, has been said does not have any obvious meaning. City of Amador v. United States DOI, 
872 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2017). And it doesn’t have any obvious meaning in FOSTA. The statute 
allows a defendant to present an affirmative defense if “prostitution is legal in the jurisdiction 
where the promotion or facilitation was targeted.” The indictment alleges that the “Illicit Web-
sites openly advertise commercial sex acts in hundreds of jurisdictions where prostitution is ille-
gal.” IN.7. It also alleges “[p]rostitution is illegal in Texas and in all 14 of the ‘Favorite Cities’ 
listed.” IN.7. States enact criminal laws, and there are only 50 of them. The indictment suggests 
that cities, townships, and villages have all enacted laws against prostitution. How is “jurisdic-
tion” supposed to be defined? How is a defendant supposed to prepare a defense when the Gov-
ernment even mixes and matches definitions? 
 The statutory text of FOSTA is so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the 
conduct it punishes. It is so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement. It is therefore un-
constitutional and invalid.  
 
The FOSTA Counts are Defective Under Even a Narrow Construction 
Count one of the indictment charges Martono with FOSTA violations under 18 U.C.S. §2421A. 
IN.10. The district court in Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, construed FOSTA nar-
rowly, presumably to save its constitutionality. 334 S. Supp. 3d 185 (D.C. 2020), reversed by 
948 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020). It held that the Travel Act gave the statute a sense of both mean-
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ing of the plain text of Section 2421A and of the likelihood of enforcement for specific conduct. 
Id. at 199, (citing GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 659 (stating that the activity which the internet service 
provides “does not satisfy the ordinary understanding of culpable assistance to a wrongdoer, 
which requires a desire to promote the wrongful venture’s success”); see also In re Aimster Cop-
yright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003). It said that by making reference to the laws of 
specific jurisdictions, Section 2421A(e)’s affirmative defense tethered subsection (a)’s prohibi-
tion on acts intended to promote or facilitate “the prostitution of another person” to specific 
crimes much in the way the Travel Act is usually construed. Woodhull, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 200. It 
construed the reference to “the prostitution of another person” as applying only to specific un-
lawful acts with respect to a particular individual, not the broad subject-matter of prostitution. 
See id. In other words, FOSTA targets only specific acts of illegal prostitution. Id. (citing United 
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008); cf. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 
476 U.S. 498, 510 n. 22 (1986) (“It is an elementary canon of  construction that a statute should 
be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative.”).  
 That court also said that Section 2421A imposes a heightened mens rea requirement for plat-
forms said to promote or facilitate particular illegal acts. Woodhull, 334 F. Supp. 3d 185, 199 
(D.C.C. 2020), (citing Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that the ac-
tivity of the internet service provides “does not satisfy the ordinary understanding of culpable 
assistance to a wrongdoer, which requires a desire to promote the wrongful venture’s success”); 
see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003). The mere promotion 
or facilitation of prostitution is not enough. The Government must prove not simply that the de-
fendant was aware of a potential result of the criminal offense, but that he intended to “explicitly 
further” a specified unlawful act. See Woodhull, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 201 (citing United States v. 
Brown, 186 F.3d 661, 670 (5th Cir. 1999). The reference to “the prostitution of another person” 
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is calculated to ensnare only specific unlawful acts with respect to a particular individual, not the 
broad subject matter of prostitution. Id.   
 The indictment is insufficient even under this narrow construction.
6
  
 Count one of the indictment charges an offense under 18 U.S.C. 2421A and tracks the statuto-
ry language, but that is not enough. Under a narrow construction of the statute, the mere promo-
tion or facilitation of prostitution is not enough. The Government must prove not simply that the 
defendant was aware of a potential result of the criminal offense, but that he intended to “explic-
itly further” a specified unlawful act against a specific individual. While some actions do not re-
quire identification of the victim, see, e.g.s., United States v. Valencia, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
90298, 2006 WL 3716657, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2006), aff’d, 600 F.3d 389 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that although wire fraud requires a victim, the victim need not be named in the indict-
ment); United States v. Hatch, 926 F.2d 387, 392 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming denial of defendant’s 
motion to dismiss where defendant argued that failure to identify proper legal victim violated his 
due-process rights by hindering his ability to prepare his defense), the existence and identity “of 
a person” is an essential element of the offense. Cf. United States v. Biyiklioglu, 652 Fed. App’x 
274, 283 (5th Cir. 2016) (reversing conviction of identity theft when the Government failed to 
prove the victim was a real person). 
 The indictment describes promoters as prostitutes, pimps, and brothels, but does not otherwise 
identify any specific “persons” who were the object of prostitution. See IN.2. The indictment 
generally identifies “prostitution advertisements,” but doesn’t define what exactly they are, how 
                                                 
66 The Government advocated the district court’s narrow construction on appeal, also presumably 
to save its constitutionality. See Woodhull, 948 F.3d at 372 (“The government maintains that 
even if the terms ‘promote’ or “facilitate’ can be read broadly in isolation, FOSTA cannot be 
read to encompass plaintiffs’ intended conduct because advocacy and educational activities do 
not promote or facilitate any specific, unlawful instance of prostitution. . . . It endorses the dis-
trict court’s interpretation that the text of Section 2421A is ‘plainly calculated to ensnare only 
specific unlawful acts with respect to a particular individual.’”).    
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they are materially different from ordinary and legal sex-related advertisements, or how they 
constitute advertisements for illegal conduct. See Backpage.com, 807 F.3d at 234 (describing 
different types of sex-related advertisements that do not constitute unlawful conduct). Indeed, 
nowhere in the introduction or in the substantive count does the indictment describe any illegal 
conduct with specificity or how Martono intended to explicitly further a specified unlawful act 
against a specific individual. See id. (recognizing that not all advertisements for sex are adver-
tisements for illegal sex).  
 Count one therefore fails to state an offense and is subject to dismissal. Counts twelve through 
twenty-eight and the Government’s seeking of criminal forfeiture based on counts twelve 
through twenty-eight are also subject to dismissal for the Government’s failure to state an of-
fense under 18 U.S.C. 2421A.   
 
The Travel Act Charges Are Insufficient and Defective 
The indictment, in counts two through eleven, charges Martono with nine substantive violations 
of the Travel Act. IN.13–14. The Travel Act provides: 
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any fa-
cility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent to— 
 
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, 
management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity, and 
thereafter performs or attempts to perform— 
(A) an act described in paragraph (1) or (3) shall be fined under this title, im-
prisoned not more than 5 years, or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(3)(A). 
The charges are insufficient and fatally defective for several reasons. First, the indictment charg-
es Martono with the specific intent to promote, manage, establish, or carry on the unlawful activ-
ity of prostitution. IN.13–14. The Travel Act defines “unlawful activity” with regard to prostitu-
tion as “any business enterprise involving . . . prostitution offenses.” 18 U.S.C. 1952(b). Thus, an 
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ongoing business enterprise is an essential element of a Travel Act violation involving prostitu-
tion. See United States v. Hagmann, 950 F.2d 175, 182 (1991) (observing that “business enter-
prise” was an essential element of the Travel Act offense as indicted). Individual postings, even 
if they are presumed to constitute offers for commercial sex transactions, do not constitute a 
business enterprise in and of themselves. The indictment fails to allege this essential element of 
the offense and is therefore fatally defective. 
 The indictment is also fatally defective because it fails to allege that Martono performed an 
overt act subsequent using an interstate facility. See 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(3)(A) (. . . thereafter per-
forms or attempts to perform an act”) The indictment contains several factual allegations to be 
taken as true: Martono is the “creator, owner, manager, and operator” of various websites; the 
websites were a passive platform which third parties used to post speech; and the websites allow 
“promoters” to post and pay for advertisements. IN.1, 2. The indictment doesn’t assert that 
Martono himself posted or published the advertisements.
7
 Its plain terms demonstrate that the 
promoters were the content providers.
8
 IN.2. The “advertisements,” then, cannot and do not con-
stitute Martono’s own overt acts in the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of 
a Texas business enterprise of prostitution. Moreover, the advertisements cited in the counts con-
stitute speech, not overt acts. Failure to allege a defendant’s subsequent overt act is a fatal defect. 
See Hagmann, 950 F.2d at 183–84; see also United States v. Hayes, 775 F.2d 1279, 1282–83 (4th 
                                                 
7
 Under 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1), no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider. 47 U.S.C. 230 is to have no effect on criminal law, but the section demonstrates the 
passive nature of an internet platform. 
8
 Under 47 U.S.C. 230(f)(3), the term “information content provider” means any person or entity 
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided 
through the internet or any other interactive computer service. The section demonstrates the fact 
that a content provider can act—create and develop information on a website—without the aid or 
assistance of an interactive computer service provider. 
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Cir. 1983) (holding that an indictment for violation of the Travel Act which does not allege a 
subsequent overt act in furtherance of unlawful activity is fatally defective). 
 Finally, the cited “advertisements,” constituting speech, do not plainly allege unlawful activi-
ty. See Backpage.com, 807 F.3d at 234 (describing different types of sex-related advertisement 
that do not constitute unlawful conduct). Texas Penal Code 43.02 criminalizes commercial trans-
actions for statutorily defined sex: 
(a) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly offers or agrees to re-
ceive a fee from another to engage in sexual conduct. 
 
(b) A person commits an offense if the person knowingly offers or agrees to pay a 
fee to another person for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct with that per-
son or another. 
 
Tex. Pen. Code 43.02. 
 The indictment characterizes the postings as “prostitution advertisements,” but none of them 
refers to or mentions a fee. They do not constitute an offer or acceptance to receive or pay a fee 
for a statutorily defined sex act. No reader could consummate a transaction from the descriptions 
stated in the indictment. They do not constitute transactions for prostitution. See State v. Roberts, 
779 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Mo. 1989) (en banc) (holding that the words uttered as an integral part of 
the prostitution transaction do not have a lawful objective and are not entitled to constitutional 
protection) (emphasis supplied).  They thus enjoy First Amendment protection because they do 
not constitute speech integral to a criminal act. The indictment, then, contains inadequate speci-
ficity of an overt act in furtherance of an illegal activity given these First Amendment concerns. 
See generally United States v. Buddenberg, No. CR-09-00263 RMW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
78201, at *12 (N. D. Cal. July 12, 2010) (holding that an indictment was too vague to enable the 
court to review the charged conduct in order to determine whether such conduct could be pun-
ished without infringing the First Amendment). This is especially true because third parties post-
ed the information, not Martono. The Court should therefore dismiss the Travel Act counts be-
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cause they fail to allege the facts of the crimes charged with sufficient sufficiency to meet the 
requirements of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 7(c)(1). See Id.      
 In the alternative, the Court should strike references to unspecified or indistinct laws. A predi-
cate to a Travel Act conviction is that the defendant must have specifically intended to promote, 
manage, establish, or carry on some form of unlawful activity prohibited by a specific state law 
or a distinct law of the United States. See United States v. Goldfarb, 643 F.2d 422, 426 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827, 102 S. Ct. 118, 20 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1981). The indictment describes 
unlawful activity as “prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the State in which they are 
committed and of the United States, including but not limited to Texas Penal Code §43.02.” 
IN.13. The specific reference to Texas Penal Code § 43.02 complies with the requirement of the 
identification of a specific law, but the rest of the description does not. The Court should strike 
the language of “of the laws of the State in which they are committed and of the United States, 
including but not limited to.”    
 In sum, the indictment fails to sufficiently allege the essential element of a business enterprise 
or a subsequent overt act of Martono unlawful activity. These defects are fatal and compel dis-
missal of the Travel Act charges. Alternatively, the indictment fails to identify acts or conduct 
that is not protected by the First Amendment and the counts should be dismissed. Finally, and in 
the alternative, the Court should strike language that refers to vague and indistinct laws.    
Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss all counts of the indictment which charges 
a violation of FOSTA, 18 U.S.C. §2421A, and its attendant forfeiture allegation. The Court 
should also dismiss counts three through eleven which charge violations of the Travel Act, 18 
U.S.C. §1952(a)(3)(A), and their attendant forfeiture allegations. Finally, the Court should also 
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dismiss counts twelve through twenty-eight which allege money laundering in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §1956(a)(1)(B)(i) because those counts rely on violations of FOSTA and the Travel Act 
as predicate offenses. 
 In the alternative, if the Court does not dismiss the Travel Act counts, the Court should strike 
language that refers to unspecified or indistinct laws.  
 
              Respectfully submitted, 
       /s/ Peter M. Barrett                  
       PETER M. BARRETT 
       State Bar No. 00790272 
       BARRETT BRIGHT LASSITER LINDER PEREZ 
       3300 Oak Lawn Avenue 
       Suite 700 
       Dallas, Texas 75219 
 O: (214) 526-0555 
 F: (214) 526-0551 
 E: peter@barrettcrimlaw.com 
        
     
       /s/ Alexandria Cazares-Perez            
 ALEXANDRIA CAZARES-PEREZ 
                   
      3300 Oak Lawn Avenue, Ste 700 
 Dallas, Texas 75219 
 O: 214.635.3509 
 F: 214.635.3509 
 E: law@cazaresperez.com 
 State Bar No. 24096446 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I hereby certify that on Thursday, September 17, 2020, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion 
to Dismiss were served upon all parties entitled to notice via the U.S. Northern District CM/ECF 
system. 
       /s/ Peter M. Barrett  
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